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Abstract
We endogenize total factor productivity in a neoclassical model
with increasing returns to scale. We obtain multiple steady-state equi-
libria with an arbitrarily small degree of increasing returns to scale.
While the most productive ￿rms operate across all the steady states,
in a poverty trap less productive ￿rms operate as well. This results in
lower average ￿rm productivity and total factor productivity. A cal-
ibrated version of our model displays sizable di⁄erences in TFP and
output across steady state equilibria.
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Keywords: endogenous productivity, multiple equilibria, poverty
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11 Introduction
We construct an endogenous total factor productivity (TFP) model that leads
to multiple steady-state equilibria and, hence, poverty traps. Our model is a
variant of the neoclassical growth model with increasing returns introduced
by Benhabib and Farmer (1994), with ￿rms modeled in the tradition of Lucas
(1978), Jovanovic (1982), and Hopenhayn (1992). There are many ex-ante
identical potential ￿rms which face an entry cost. Firms that choose to enter
are entitled to produce an intermediate good with a productivity level drawn
independently across ￿rms from a given distribution. Because ￿rms face a
￿xed operating cost, the decision to operate depends on the level of the ￿rm￿ s
productivity. Productivity must be high enough so that the ￿rm generates
enough revenue (net of payments to factor inputs) to cover the operating cost.
In other words, the operating cost de￿nes a cuto⁄: ￿rms with productivity
above the cuto⁄ choose to operate, the rest of the ￿rms choose not to. The
higher the cuto⁄, the more productive the average ￿rm is.
The existence of multiple steady states depends on small demand exter-
nalities, which imply increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level. The
main result of our paper is that poverty traps may occur for arbitrarily small
increasing returns to scale.1 Endogenizing TFP allows us to bridge the gap
between poverty trap models based on increasing returns and the most recent
empirical literature on the degree of returns to scale. An endogenous oper-
ating cost provides a powerful amplifying mechanism for increasing returns.
We model the operating cost as payments to overhead labor. Since the wage
is endogenous, so is the lowest level of productivity used in the economy. This
endogeneity may lead to multiple steady states. Consider an economy in a
steady state with a high productivity cuto⁄ and a large capital stock. The
high cuto⁄ implies that ￿rms￿average productivity is high. A large capital
stock and high productivity imply that the wage is high, as is the operating
cost. A high operating cost makes low productivity ￿rms unpro￿table, e⁄ec-
tively cleansing the pool of ￿rms. This justi￿es why the cuto⁄ is high in the
￿rst place. Since only high productivity ￿rms are operating, TFP is high.
Conversely, in a steady state where capital is low and lower productivity
￿rms are operating (i.e., the cuto⁄ is low), the wage is low. Since the wage
1Gal￿ (1995) obtains multiple equilibria and poverty traps in a model where increasing
returns stem from endogenous markups. However, the empirical evidence summarized in
Section 4.2 below suggests that the degree of increasing returns is much smaller than the
level required to obtain poverty traps in Gal￿￿ s model.
1is low, lower pro￿ts are su¢ cient to cover the operating cost. That is, the
low operating cost sullies the pool of producers, leading to lower TFP and
capital. In a good equilibrium high productivity ￿rms produce more than in
a bad equilibrium, despite facing a higher wage and the same interest rate.
This is optimal because ￿rms face a higher demand for their goods, which
o⁄sets the contractionary pressure of higher factor prices.
The role of endogenous ￿rms entry as a powerful amplifying mechanism
to increasing returns to scale is not limited to the study of poverty traps.
Barseghyan and DiCecio (2008) analyze indeterminacy and sunspot ￿ uctua-
tions in an endogenous TFP model. Jaimovich (2007) analyzes a model where
endogenous net business formation is procyclical: This implies endogenous
countercyclical variations in markup and indeterminacy. Endogenizing en-
try (see Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz, 2007; Jaimovich and Floetotto, 2008)
can also provide a powerful propagation mechanism for real business cycle
models.
Empirical motivation for our work stems from the studies of the deter-
minants of cross-country income di⁄erences of Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare
(1997), Hall and Jones (1999), and Caselli (2005). These authors ￿nd that
income di⁄erences can be attributed, at least in part, to di⁄erences in TFP.
Previous studies of poverty trap models with endogenous TFP pointed to
the failure of adopting the most productive technology as the cause of low
TFP and income in poor countries.2 However, there is evidence pointing to
the fact that di⁄erences in TFP across economies are related to the lowest
level of ￿rms￿productivity. Comin and Hobijn (2004) take a comprehensive
look at the uses of various technologies as determinants of TFP and ￿nd
that the key is not when new, better technologies are adopted, but when
old, obsolete ones are relinquished. Also, the empirical evidence on the im-
portance of international knowledge spillovers summarized in Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (2005) suggests that all countries can easily access frontier
technologies. Banerjee and Du￿ o (2005) cite the McKinsey Global Institute
(2001) report on India, which ￿nds that while larger production units (￿rms)
use relatively new technologies, smaller (in home) production units have low
productivity. Finally, Mokyr (1990, 2001) argues that the Industrial Revo-
lution was characterized by a shift from less productive forms of production
2See, for example, Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989) and Ciccone and Matsuyama
(1996). For comprehensive reviews of the literature on poverty traps, see Matsuyama
(2005) and Azariadis and Stachurski (2005).
2(workshops) to more productive ones (factories).
A successful model of cross-country income and productivity di⁄erences
should also provide a plausible story of how a ￿growth miracle￿can occur,
i.e., it should be consistent with the transition of a country from low to
high output and productivity. In our model economy, a growth miracle is
a transition from a bad equilibrium (low productivity cuto⁄) to a good one
(high productivity cuto⁄). Such a take-o⁄ can be triggered by technological
progress that makes the highest productivity ￿rms even more productive or
by a decline in the entry cost. In the ￿rst case, the increase in productivity
of the best ￿rms makes them more competitive, raising factor prices and
driving low productivity ￿rms out of business. In the second case, a decline
in the entry cost brings about more competition from entering ￿rms, driving
out of the market low productivity ￿rms. In both cases, along the transition
path, the economy￿ s TFP, output, capital, and ￿rms￿average productivity
(and size) rise. An increase in the average ￿rm size, caused by a massive
shift of employment from small to large establishments, is a de￿ning feature
of the Industrial Revolution. A similar increase is recorded in the case of
Japan￿ s growth miracle. Between 1957 and 1969, the employment share of
Japan￿ s smallest establishments declined from 41 to 31:5 percent.
A calibrated version of our model is able to generate sizeable di⁄erences
across two stable steady states. For example, with 25 percent increasing
returns and a 65 percent capital share3 TFP in the high steady states is 45
percent larger than in the low steady state. The corresponding di⁄erence in
levels of output across steady states is larger than 600 percent.
Finally, our model￿ s implications are consistent with the literature which
explores the e⁄ects that various barriers have on productivity: e.g., Parente
and Prescott (1994, 2000), Restuccia and Rogerson (2003), Erosa and Hi-
dalgo Cabrillana (2005), Herrendorf and Teixeira (2005a,b), and Barseghyan
(2008).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 studies its steady state, dynamics properties, and some extensions.
Section 4 provides an interpretation of growth miracles that arise naturally in
the model and discusses the quantitative implications of a calibrated version
of the model. We conclude in Section 5. We provide proofs in an appendix.
3A capital share this high is meant to capture the fact that our model does not include
explicitly other forms of capital besides physical capital.
32 The Model
Our model is a variant of the neoclassical growth model. The model de-
parts from the standard framework by having a richer structure of the pro-
duction side of the economy. We model ￿rms following Lucas (1978), Jo-
vanovic (1982), and Hopenhayn (1992). Firms are heterogenous: each ￿rm
has monopoly power over the good it produces, and ￿rms have di⁄erent pro-
ductivity levels. Two features of the production side of the economy are
crucial for the results of the paper:
1. a sunk entry cost;
2. an operating cost: in addition to capital and labor used directly in
production, ￿rms pay for a ￿xed amount of overhead labor.
A part of the entry costs stems from satisfying di⁄erent o¢ cial regulatory
requirements (see Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2002).
In addition, in some countries, entry requires signi￿cant side payments to
local o¢ cials.4 Entry cost may also include expenses related to acquisition
of ￿rm-speci￿c capital,5 acquisition of appropriate technology,6 and market
research.
The operating cost typically refers to overhead labor and expenses that
are lumpy in nature (e.g., renting a physical location). According to the
￿ndings of Domowitz, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988), in U.S. manufacturing
plants, the overhead labor accounts for 31 percent of total labor. Ramey
(1991) suggests that overhead labor is about 20 percent. The preferred esti-
mate of overhead inputs in Basu (1996) is 28 percent.
We also assume that ￿rms learn their productivity only after a sunk entry
cost is paid. This assumption re￿ ects very high uncertainty faced by entering
￿rms. This is routinely found in the data and documented, for example, by
Klette and Kortum (2004) as a stylized fact.
4In the case of Peru, this is documented by De Soto (1989).
5Ramey and Shapiro (2001) show that in some instances the speci￿city of ￿rm capital
is so extreme that the sale price of such capital after a ￿rm has been dissolved is only a
small fraction of the original cost.
6See, for example, Atkeson and Kehoe (2005).
42.1 Households
There is a continuum of households that supply a ￿xed amount of labor,
consume, invest, and own all ￿rms in the economy. The problem of the





tU(Ct); ￿ 2 (0;1) (1)
s.t. Ct + It = rtKt + wt + ￿t + Tt;
It = Kt+1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt;
where Ct denotes consumption, It is investment, Kt denotes the total house-
hold capital, rt is the rental rate on capital, and wt is the wage:7 ￿t is the
￿rms￿pro￿ts, and Tt is a lump-sum transfer from the government; ￿ and
￿ 2 (0;1) are the discount rate and depreciation rate, respectively. We
assume a constant elasticity of substitution utility function with elasticity
￿ > 0.
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Final Good Producers
The ￿nal consumption good in this economy is produced by perfectly com-









where ￿t is the number of intermediate goods produced in the economy, ￿ is a
constant which is greater than 1, and yt(i) is the quantity of the intermediate
good i. Let pt(i) be the price of the ith intermediate good relative to the ￿nal















7We assume that the household inelastically supplies one unit of labor.
5and the ￿rst-order optimality condition implies that the demand function for








2.2.2 Intermediate Goods Producers
A ￿rm in the intermediate goods sector lives for one period and is pro￿t
maximizing. All ￿rms are ex-ante identical. There is a sunk entry cost, ￿.8
Once the entry cost is paid, a ￿rm gains the ability to produce an intermediate
good. The ￿rm has monopoly power over the good it produces. Next, the
￿rm draws a productivity parameter A(j), where j is drawn from an i.i.d.







where k(j) and n(j) denote capital and labor, respectively. The productivity
parameter di⁄ers among the ￿rms. A ￿rm with a higher index has a higher
productivity parameter, i.e., A(j) > A(i) for j > i. In addition, function
A(j) is assumed to be continuous, and A(0) = 0: The parameter ￿ 2 (0;￿)
determines the degree of returns to scale in variable inputs.9 The parameter
￿ is between zero and 1.
If a ￿rm decides to produce, it must incur an operating cost in terms of
wages paid to ￿ units of overhead labor. Consider the decision of a ￿rm born
in time t with a draw j. If it decides to produce, its pro￿ts are
￿P
t (j) = maxkt(j);nt(j) pt (j)yt(j) ￿ rtkt(j) ￿ wt [nt(j) + ￿]













The decision to produce or not depends on whether ￿P
t (j) is positive. There-
fore, the jth ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts, ￿F
t (j), are given by
￿
F
t (j) = maxf￿
P
t (j);0g: (4)
8We assume that ￿ is denominated in consumption units and that all entry-cost pay-
ments are rebated to the households in a lump-sum fashion. Alternatively, one can model
￿ as a sunk investment, i.e., in units of capital. Such a formulation would not change any
of our results, but it would make the exposition more cumbersome.
9This is what Lucas (1978) calls managers￿span of control.
6Free entry implies that, in equilibrium, ￿rms￿expected pro￿ts must be equal




t (j)dj = ￿: (5)
2.2.3 Firms￿average productivity
We derive the equilibrium relationship between the ￿rms￿average productiv-
ity and the operating cost. First, we determine the lowest productivity level
necessary for a ￿rm to decide to produce. The existence of economy-wide
competitive factor markets implies that in equilibrium, the gross pro￿ts, cap-














where a(j) ￿ A(j)
1￿￿
￿￿￿. The ￿rst-order conditions of problem (3) imply that
pro￿ts from producing are equal to the ￿rm￿ s share of the gross pro￿ts (1￿
￿
￿)
minus the operating cost10:
￿
P





t (j) is increasing in j and, since a(j) = 0; there exists a cuto⁄￿rm,




)pt(Jt)yt(Jt) = ￿wt: (7)
Firms with indices higher than Jt will produce, and those with lower indices










The previous equation de￿nes the cuto⁄Jt as a function of the operating cost
￿wt: An increase in the cuto⁄Jt has two e⁄ects: Pro￿ts of every ￿rm decline,
and the number of producing ￿rms as a fraction of entering ￿rms declines.
Therefore, the right-hand side of (8) is decreasing in Jt and increasing in the




7￿xed cost (￿wt): Hence, the cuto⁄is increasing in the operating cost. There-
fore, ￿rms￿average productivity, ￿ a(Jt) =
R 1
Jt a(j)dj
1￿Jt ; is an increasing function
of the operating cost.
2.2.4 Entry and the number of operating ￿rms
Entry in this model refers to the number of ￿rms that pay the entry cost,
￿. The number of entering ￿rms di⁄ers from the number of operating ￿rms
because only a fraction of entrants will have productivity high enough to
operate: the pool of producers consists only of ￿rms which have an index
higher than Jt. In particular, let ￿t denote the number of entering ￿rms and





2.3 Aggregate Output and TFP




















where ut is the fraction of labor used in production. Finally, the rental rate























82.4 Closing the Model
The resource constraint is given by
Ct + Kt+1 = Yt + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt: (16)
The only role the government has in the model is to collect the entry fees
￿t￿ from ￿rms and rebate them lump-sum to the households:
Tt = ￿t￿: (17)




Nt = 1: (19)
The de￿nition of equilibrium is standard.
3 Steady States, Dynamics, and Some Exten-
sions
In this section we analyze the existence and stability of the steady states,
and discuss some extensions to our basic model. The main ￿nding is that
there can be multiple stable steady states for an arbitrarily low degree of
increasing returns to scale.
Intuitively, if there are multiple steady states, their existence is due to
the endogenous productivity mechanism embedded in the model. Equation
(8) relates the cuto⁄ J to the operating cost, ￿wt: The integral on the right-
hand side of this equation is decreasing in Jt. Thus, a higher operating cost
translates into a higher cuto⁄ and vice versa. In an economy where the
operating cost is high, higher (gross) pro￿ts are required to cover this cost.
Only high productivity ￿rms can generate such pro￿ts. Therefore, the lower
productivity ￿rms are forced out from the pool of producers. As the operating
cost increases, the entry cost relative to operating cost falls, allowing more
￿rms to enter. However, only the ones with higher productivity ￿rms are
pro￿table enough to operate. This relation between the operating cost and
the cuto⁄ provides economic intuition for the existence of multiple steady
states. If multiple steady states exist, then one steady state has high capital
9and only high productivity ￿rms are operating. High capital stock and high
productivity imply that the wage rate is high, and so is the operating cost.
A high operating cost, in turn, justi￿es why only high productivity ￿rms are
operating. Finally, since productivity is high, a high capital stock is necessary
to equate the return on capital to 1=￿: Conversely, in a ￿low￿steady state,
the capital stock and ￿rms￿average productivity are low. This implies a low
operating cost which allows lower productivity ￿rms to operate. Since ￿rms￿
average productivity is low, the capital stock must be low to have the return
on capital equal to 1=￿: A ￿rm productive enough to be active in di⁄erent
steady states produces more in a good steady state than in a bad one, despite
a higher wage and the same interest rate. This is optimal because it faces
a higher demand for its goods, which o⁄sets the contractionary pressure of
higher factor prices.
3.1 Steady States
We present the argument formally in Propositions 1 and 2; we provide proofs
in Appendix A. First, note that the number of ￿rms is proportional to the





















There are two components of TFP: ￿rms￿average productivity (￿ a(Jt))
(￿￿￿)
and the term u
(1￿￿)￿
t (1 ￿ ut)
￿￿￿ ; which we call the labor allocation compo-
nent. Firms￿average productivity is increasing in Jt. The labor allocation
component is a function of Jt as well, though not necessarily monotonic.
However, the e⁄ect of Jt on average productivity dominates, and TFPt is
increasing in Jt.
The following proposition allows us to present the model economy in a
more familiar, neoclassical framework.
10Proposition 1 The aggregate production function in (12) and the total fac-
tor productivity in (21) are increasing in the cuto⁄ Jt: The cuto⁄ Jt; the wage
wt; and the aggregate output Yt are all increasing functions of capital Kt: The
rate of return on capital Rt ￿ (rt + 1 ￿ ￿) is a function of Kt:
Proof. See Appendix A.
The proposition above implies that the dynamics of the economy can be






Ct + Kt+1 = Y (Kt) + (1 ￿ ￿)Kt;
(22)
plus a transversality condition. We now turn to the existence and multiplicity
of steady states.
Proposition 2 The economy characterized by the system in (22) generically
has an odd number of steady states. For any ￿ > 1, there exist a distribution
of productivities, a(j), and a value of ￿ such that the system (22) has multiple
steady-state equilibria.
Proof. (sketch) Straightforward manipulations of the ￿rst order conditions
lead to the following relation between the rate of return on capital and the
cuto⁄ J in steady state:
r
1￿￿￿





















and ￿ is a constant. Since ￿(J) is continuous and ￿(0) = 1; ￿(1) = 0;
there always exists at least one value of J 2 (0;1) which satis￿es equation
(23). To have multiple solutions, it is necessary that the function ￿ has to
be non-monotone (see Figure 2). In Appendix A we show that there always
exists a function a(j) such that this is the case. With a non-monotone ￿(J),
it is trivial to ￿nd a value of ￿ such that equation (23) has multiple solutions.
Note that equation (23) implies that if ￿(J) is increasing, so is r(K): The
necessary condition for the existence of multiple steady states is that for some
values of K the return on capital must be increasing. The properties of the
11function ￿ mimic those of ￿rms￿expected pro￿ts, i.e., the right-hand side of
the zero-pro￿t condition (8). A necessary condition for existence of multiple
steady state is that ￿rms￿expected pro￿ts are increasing in J. An increase in
the cuto⁄ J has two opposite e⁄ects. On one hand the wage rate increases,
increasing expected pro￿ts. On the other hand, a higher J implies a lower
value of the integral on the right-hand side of (8). For expected pro￿ts to
rise with J, the increase in the wage has to dominate the fall in the value of
the integral. A su¢ cient condition for this is that @￿ a(J)=@J ￿ @a(J)=@J:
A relatively high derivative of the average productivity guarantees a strong
positive e⁄ect on TFP and the wage rate, while a relatively low derivative of
the function a(J) implies a mild negative response of the integral term. A
function a(j) which is su¢ ciently ￿ at on some interval and increases rapidly
for higher values of j has this property.
Given Propositions 1 and 2 it is easy to establish that the ￿high J￿econ-
omy has higher capital stock, higher output, higher total factor productivity,
and higher average productivity for ￿rms.
3.2 Dynamics
The following proposition characterizes the behavior of the economy around
the steady state(s).11
Proposition 3 Steady states with an odd index are saddles. Steady states
with an even index can be classi￿ed as follows:
1. source, if Y 0 ￿ ￿ > ￿CR0
R and
￿





2. unstable spiral, if Y 0 ￿ ￿ > ￿CR0
R and
￿





3. sink, if Y 0 ￿ ￿ < ￿CR0
R and
￿





4. stable spiral, if Y 0 ￿ ￿ < ￿CR0
R and
￿





Proof. See appendix A.
For the parameter values we consider in the rest of the paper, we obtain
three steady states, with the odd steady state unstable (cases 1 and 2 in
Proposition 3). In comparing output and TFP across steady states we will
focus on the two stable steady states.
11An analysis of the global dynamics of our model is beyond the scope of this paper,
and we refer the reader to Gal￿ (1995) and Slobodyan (2005).
123.3 Extending the Basic Model
In this section we consider two possible extensions of our basic model. First,
we consider the implications of endogenizing the entry cost. Then, we analyze
in￿nitely lived ￿rms.
3.3.1 Entry and Operating Costs
The key feature of the model that accounts for the existence multiple steady-
state equilibria is the asymmetry between the entry cost and the operating
cost. While the operating cost is endogenous, the entry cost is not. This
assumption can be relaxed to allow for both entry and operating costs to
be endogenous. In this case, multiple steady-state equilibria exist as long as
a weaker form of asymmetry is preserved. In particular, the operating cost
has to be increasing in capital faster than the entry cost, so that the ratio
of the operating cost to the entry cost is increasing in capital. We suggest
a simple example, based on Atkeson and Kehoe (2005). Let the entry cost
take the form of ￿ units of entry services, which ￿rms need to purchase to
enter. Let the production function of these services be exactly the same as
it is for consumption goods, except for a di⁄erent labor intensity. It can be











where ￿ and ￿ are positive constants. When ￿ is 1, it is the same zero-pro￿t
condition discussed above. When ￿ is zero, it is the same as in Atkeson and
Kehoe (2005). As long as ￿ is positive, the key relation between wage w and
the cuto⁄ J is preserved and the model admits multiple equilibria.
3.3.2 In￿nitely Lived Firms
One unrealistic simplifying assumption in our model is that ￿rms live only
for one period. Our results are easily extended to in￿nitely-lived ￿rms with
time-varying productivity. We consider two opposite cases:
1. ￿rms￿productivity in every period is given by A(j); where j is the
original draw.
2. ￿rms draw a new j which is independent of past draws.
13We also assume that ￿rms die with constant probability (1 ￿ p). Consider
a period-t decision of a ￿rm born in time s with a draw j. The Bellman













t (s;j) is the pro￿ts from producing as de￿ned in Section 2.2.2, and
Rt+1 is the rate of return on capital (i.e., the interest rate).12 The law of
motion of j is j0 = j in case 1 and j0 is i.i.d. uniform over [0;1] in case 2.





Proposition 2 extends to both cases. If ￿rms￿productivity is the same as
the original draw, the function ￿ is unchanged. For the case of i.i.d. draws,









































Notice that when p = 0, case 2 simpli￿es to our baseline model in Section
2, i.e., ~ ￿(J)jp=0 = ￿(J).
4 Properties of the Model
In this section we discuss some qualitative and quantitative properties of
our model. First we consider a growth miracle in the model, driven by
technological progress or a decrease in entry costs. We argue that the decline
in the share of small ￿rms is consistent with Japan￿ s post-World War II
experience and with the Industrial Revolution. Then we compute di⁄erences
in output and TFP in a calibrated version of the model, and we perform
12Recall that the ￿rms are owned by the households and there is no aggregate uncertainty
in the economies we consider. Therefore, 1=Rt+1 is the relevant discount factor.















No. of firms share
Figure 1: Smallest establishments in Japan: employment and number of
￿rms shares.
sensitivity analysis on the degree of increasing returns to scale and capital
share parameters. We conclude that the di⁄erences between high and low
steady states are sizable.
4.1 Growth Miracles: An Interpretation
A puzzle closely related to cross-country income di⁄erences is the question of
how and why countries grow and what causes growth miracles. A common
view in the literature is that growth miracles are a result of a dramatic shift
towards more productive ￿rms and better forms of industrial organization.
For example, Mokyr (2001) states that the Industrial Revolution was accom-
panied by ￿the ever-growing physical separation of the unit of consumption
(household) from the unit of production (plant),...￿due to ￿... concentration
of former artisans and domestic workers under one roof (plants), in which
workers were more or less continuing what they were doing before, only away
from home ...￿and ￿... a more radical change in production technique, with
substantial investment in ￿xed capital combined with strict supervision and
rigid discipline.￿Thus, plants and factories (i.e., bigger establishments) must
have been more productive than ￿in home￿production units (i.e., the small-
est establishments), and the Industrial Revolution can be viewed as a shift
of resources from smaller, less productive units to larger, more productive
ones.
15Japan postwar growth miracle is similar in this respect to the Industrial
Revolution (see Figure 1): the labor share of the smallest establishments (i.e.,
establishments with nine employees or fewer) fell by 9 percentage points
between 1957 and 1969.13 The period from 1957 to 1969 was a period of
remarkable economic growth, which Parente and Prescott (2005) classify as
a period of a growth miracle. Such a shift in our model￿ s framework depends
on the properties of the function a(j): If the corresponding probability density
function of productivities is one that implies the existence of multiple steady
states (i.e., it has a high density somewhere at the lower tail), then a shift
from small to the large establishments occurs when the economy moves away
from a ￿low J￿steady state to a ￿high J￿steady state.
There are two reasons that can cause such a shift. The ￿rst one, is a
decline in entry barriers, i.e., a decline in the entry cost, ￿.
To illustrate this point, it is useful to start with Figure 2. For larger
values of ￿, there is a unique, low-cuto⁄steady state, and for lower ￿￿ s there
is a unique steady state, with large J. For intermediate values of ￿ there
can be two steady states. A small change in the value of ￿ can lead to large
di⁄erences in J and the corresponding values of capital and output. In our
model economy, the best technologies available are used regardless of the
magnitude of the entry cost. The usage of worse technologies, on the other
hand, depends on the entry cost. A reduction in the entry cost can cleanse the
economy of lower productivity ￿rms, increasing ￿rms￿average productivity
and TFP. This mechanism of growth miracles shares a common driving force,
reduction of barriers, with the one of Parente and Prescott (2000). However,
the e⁄ect of the reduction of the barriers is di⁄erent. In their model new,
better technologies are not being used because of the barriers. Here, the
entry barriers determine not the highest, but the lowest level of technology
that is being used in the economy.
The second reason for a growth miracle is technological progress. A nat-
ural way to introduce this into our model is to consider a one-time permanent
increase in the function a(j) for values of j close to 1.14 That is, the best
13The data is from various issues of the Japan Statistical Yearbook, edited by the Statis-
tical Training Institute and published by the Statistics Bureau, both under the Ministry
of Internal A⁄airs and Communications. Data is available every three years for the period
1951-1981 and every ￿ve years subsequently. The unit of observation is the establish-
ment, i.e., a single physical location where the business is conducted or where services or
industrial operations are performed.
14A better model to address the e⁄ect of productivity improvements would be one where









High k: "low J" equilibrium
Intermediatek: "low J" and "high J" equilibria












Figure 2: The role of the entry cost, ￿.









; if j ￿ ^ J;
a(j); otherwise;
where ^ J is close to 1, and q is greater than 1. For any J < ^ J; the change
in the function a causes ￿(J) to rise. If such a rise is su¢ ciently large, the
￿low J￿steady state will disappear (see Figure 3 below), and the economy
will start growing toward a ￿high J￿steady state.
4.2 Model Calibration
Our model contains seven parameters (￿; ￿; ￿; ￿; ￿; ￿; ￿), plus any additional
parameters determining the function a(j). The model￿ s implications are ro-
bust to the choice of ￿ and ￿ for the commonly used values of ￿ 2 (0:94;0:99)
the highest level of technology that is available in the economy grows over time. Building
and examining such a model is left for future research.























H equilibrium: unique and stable
old J
H equilibrium: stable
Figure 3: A growth miracle driven by technological progress.
and ￿ 2 (0:08;0:12): Therefore, we set ￿ = 0:95 and ￿ = 0:10: The parame-
ters ￿; ￿; and ￿ deserve more consideration.
The ￿rst parameter, ￿; governs the degree of increasing returns to scale
in the economy. There has been a large debate in the recent literature on the
magnitude of increasing returns in the economy. While earlier researchers
(most notably, Hall, 1988) suggested that there are large increasing returns
to scale in the economy, subsequent work has shown that the returns to
scale can be best described as constant or at most moderately increasing.
The latest estimates of ￿ are probably those constructed by Laitner and
Stolyarov (2004). Their preferred point estimate is ￿ = 1:1, with con￿dence
interval (1:03;1:2). These ￿gures are close to the estimates of Bartelsman,
Caballero, and Lyons (1994), Burnside (1996), Burnside, Eichenbaum, and
Rebelo (1995), Basu (1996), Basu and Fernald (1997), and Harrison (2003).
Hence, we calibrate our model with ￿ = 1:1.
The next parameter, ￿; represents the share of output that goes to capital
and labor used directly in production, for a given value of ￿. Note that in the
model there is a di⁄erence between aggregate returns to scale and ￿rm level
18returns to scale. While at the aggregate level there are increasing returns
to scale, at the ￿rm level, as long as ￿ < 1; the returns to scale in variable
inputs are decreasing. In our model, heterogenous productivity leads to a
heterogenous degree of returns to scale in all inputs. For ￿rms with higher
productivity, the decreasing returns to scale in variable inputs dominate the
increasing returns to scale e⁄ect of the ￿xed cost; for the ￿rms with lower
productivity, it is the opposite. These observations are broadly consistent
with empirical ￿ndings of Basu (1996), and Basu and Fernald (1997).15 As a
benchmark, we consider ￿ = 0:85￿, which is the preferred value of Atkeson
and Kehoe (2005) and is very close to the estimated value of 0:84 in Basu
(1996).
The choice of the next parameter, ￿, depends on the interpretation of sk:
Interpreted literally, this is the capital share of output. However, if a part
of ￿rms￿(entrepreneurs￿ ) share of output, i.e., (1 ￿ ￿=￿); is interpreted as
capital income, then sk is less than the capital share of output. With this
interpretation, one needs to take a stand on how the ￿rm￿ s share of output
is divided between capital and labor. A commonly used rule is to split this
share so that the capital share of output is ￿: As a starting point, we set sk
to 0:4. This implies that when ￿ is set to (0:85￿); ￿ is equal to 0:47.
We have shown that for some functions a(j) there will be multiple stable
steady states. The key property of the function a(j) that generates multi-
plicity of equilibria is that ￿ aJ strongly dominates aJ for some J.16 A function
that has this property is one that is su¢ ciently ￿ at on some interval (J1;J2).
The larger this interval is, the farther apart the stable steady states are from
each other. In terms of ￿rms￿productivity distribution, this translates into
the lower steady state having a large number of ￿rms with nearly the same

















; if j > J2:
(29)
We normalize ￿ to 1,17 and we choose ￿ and the ￿ve parameters pinning
15See Kim (2004) for a detailed discussion on di⁄erent ways of modeling increasing
returns to scale.
16See proof of Propositon 2 in Appendix A.
17Notice that for our results only ￿=￿
￿￿￿
1￿￿￿ matters (see equations (23) and (37) in
19J1 J2 b N1 N2 ￿
1e ￿ 6 0:97 2:13 280:2 104:2 0:50
Table 1: Parameter Values: function a(j) and ￿xed cost
down the productivity distribution (J1, J2, N1, N2, b) so that the distribution
of ￿rms by size implied by our model in the two stable steady state is as close
as possible to the distributions of ￿rms by size in the average Least Developed
Country (LDC) and in the U.S. (see Tybout, 2000, Table 1). Notice how in
the average LDC the distribution of ￿rms by size is characterized by a much




























































Figure 4: Employment Shares: model versus data.
Figure 4 portrays the distributions of ￿rms by size for the U.S. and the
average LDC (right column), together with the distributions for the high and
low steady states of our model (left column).
Appendix A).










Figure 5: Calibrated function a(j).
21Figure 5 reports the function a(j), which minimizes the distance between
the model distributions and their empirical counterparts.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we conduct sensitivity analysis of the baseline calibration by
analyzing how varying the degree of increasing returns to scale and the capital
share maps into di⁄erences across the high and the low steady states of our
model.
Tables 2-5 present the ratios of values of output and TFP levels for the
two stable steady states for di⁄erent parameter values. In the ￿rst column of
Tables 2-5 we report the worst-case scenario of no increasing returns to scale,
together with the most favorable function a(j). In the remaining columns
we maintain a(j) ￿xed to the calibrated function discussed above, and we
analyze the e⁄ect of varying the capital share and the ratio of ￿ to ￿.
￿
1a 1:01 1:05 1:1 1:15 1:2 1:25
0:95￿ 1:05 1:03 1:03 1:03 1:03 1:03 1:04
￿ 0:9￿ 1:12 1:06 1:06 1:07 1:07 1:08 1:08
0:85￿ 1:19 1:10 1:10 1:11b 1:12 1:13 1:14
0:8￿ 1:28 1:14 1:16 1:17 1:18 1:20 1:22
a Theoretical upper bound for ￿ ! 1. b Benchmark calibration.
Table 2: Relative TFP and returns to scale (sk = 0.4)
￿
1a 1:01 1:05 1:1 1:15 1:2 1:25
0:95￿ 1:09 1:05 1:05 1:06 1:06 1:07 1:07
￿ 0:9￿ 1:20 1:10 1:11 1:12 1:14 1:15 1:17
0:85￿ 1:33 1:17 1:19 1:21b 1:23 1:26 1:30
0:8￿ 1:50 1:25 1:28 1:32 1:37 1:42 1:48
a Theoretical upper bound for ￿ ! 1. b Benchmark calibration.
Table 3: Relative output and returns to scale (sk = 0.4)
The limiting case of ￿ equal to 1 has the least favorable implications
for the existence of multiple steady states, because the model essentially
22￿
1a 1:01 1:05 1:1 1:15 1:2 1:25
0:36 1:19 1:10 1:10 1:11 1:12 1:13 1:13
0:4 1:19 1:10 1:10 1:11b 1:12 1:13 1:14
sk 0:45 1:19 1:10 1:11 1:12 1:13 1:14 1:15
0:55 1:20 1:10 1:11 1:12 1:13 1:14 1:16
0:6 1:20 1:11 1:12 1:13 1:14 1:16 1:18
0:65 1:22 1:12 1:13 1:15 1:19 1:26 1:45
a Theoretical upper bound for ￿ ! 1. b Benchmark calibration.
Table 4: Relative TFP and capital share (￿ = 0.85)
￿
1a 1:01 1:05 1:1 1:15 1:2 1:25
0:36 1:31 1:16 1:17 1:19 1:21 1:23 1:26
0:4 1:33 1:17 1:19 1:21b 1:23 1:26 1:30
sk 0:45 1:38 1:19 1:21 1:24 1:28 1:32 1:37
0:55 1:43 1:22 1:25 1:29 1:34 1:40 1:48
0:6 1:50 1:26 1:30 1:35 1:43 1:54 1:70
0:65 1:75 1:39 1:48 1:66 1:99 2:87 7:27
a Theoretical upper bound for ￿ ! 1. b Benchmark calibration.
Table 5: Relative output and capital share (￿ = 0.85)
collapses to the standard neoclassical model. It is important to see how large
the steady state di⁄erences can be for ￿ arbitrarily close to 1. The condition
for the existence of multiple steady states translates to a(J) being (almost)
a constant over some interval. In this case, the extremes of this interval
correspond to the two steady-state values of J. This implies that the ratio of
total factor productivity, capital, and output levels in the two stable steady


















23When our economy approaches constant returns to scale, the endogenous
TFP mechanism alone is quite powerful and it can generate di⁄erences in
TFP and output across steady states of up to 28 and 50 percent, respectively.
In the studies of the long-run behavior of an economy, using the proper
measure of capital share of output is of crucial importance. For example, for
the uni￿ed theory of Parente and Prescott (2005) to be successful, the capital
share of output should be between 0:55 and 0:65. The magnitude of this share
depends on the de￿nition of investment (capital). In the context of this
paper it is proper to de￿ne investment as ￿any allocation of resources that is
designed to increase future productivity￿(see Parente and Prescott, 2000).
That is, investment should include maintenance and repair, research and
development, software, investment in organizational capital, and investment
in human capital. Parente and Prescott (2000) ￿nd that including these
items in investment implies that the capital share of output is larger than
1=2 and can reach as high as 2=3.18
The capital share is important for two reasons. First, there is a standard
neoclassical e⁄ect: The higher the capital share is, the higher the e⁄ect of
TFP is on the economy. For two economies di⁄ering only in their TFP, the





TFP H=TFP L￿ 1
1￿sk￿￿. The higher the share of capital is, the higher the
di⁄erence in steady state capital is between the two economies.
Second, the capital share directly impacts TFP, because it enters into
the de￿nition of TFP in (21) and into the de￿nition of the function ￿(J)
in (24). Because of the highly non-linear nature of TFP and ￿ as functions
of the cuto⁄ J; it is not possible to derive analytically the e⁄ect of an in-
crease in the capital share on the resulting TFP di⁄erences across the steady
states. However, when ￿ tends to 1 the theoretical upper bound on these
di⁄erences gets larger as the capital share grows (see equation (31) above).
For all numerical experiments (Table 4) the increase in the capital share of
output increases the TFP di⁄erences. Combined with the ￿neoclassical ef-
fect￿described above, this leads to even larger di⁄erences in output and in
capital across the steady states (Table 5).
For sk = 0:4 and ￿ = 1:1, our baseline calibration, TFP and output di⁄er
18For details and references see the original paper. A large portion of the unmeasured
capital is organization capital. Findings of Atkeson and Kehoe (2005) imply that the
value of organizational capital in the US manufacturing sector is larger than the value of
physical capital.
24across steady states by a factor of 1:1 and 1:21, respectively. Di⁄erences
across steady states increase in ￿ and sk. When both sk and ￿ are high, the
resulting di⁄erences in output are large, reaching as much as 627 percent.
5 Conclusions
Recent empirical studies attribute a sizable fraction of cross-country income
di⁄erences to di⁄erences in TFP. These di⁄erences re￿ ect, in part, the fact
that the fraction of low productivity ￿rms in less developed countries is
much higher than in industrialized countries. We introduce heterogeneity
in productivity across ￿rms in an otherwise standard model. In our model
di⁄erences in TFP arise endogenously, and we obtain multiple steady-state
equilibria for an arbitrarily small degree of increasing returns to scale. If an
economy is in a good steady state, only the most productive ￿rms operate,
leading to high TFP, capital, and output. In an economy locked in a poverty
trap the pool of producers is sullied by low productivity ￿rms, with low TFP,
capital and output.
We analyze the qualitative properties of our model by studying a growth
miracle. A growth miracle can be induced by technological progress or by
a decline in entry barriers and it is accompanied by a shift of employment
from small to large ￿rms. This is consistent with the Industrial Revolution
and postwar Japan growth experiences. We calibrate our model using stan-
dard parameter values and a distribution of productivity across ￿rms which
matches the distribution of ￿rms by size across developed and LDC coun-
tries. Our calibrated economy displays large di⁄erences in TFP across stable
steady states and even larger di⁄erences in output levels.
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29A Proofs of Propositions
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Equations (14) and (15) imply that the fraction of labor used in production







Substituting this expression of ut into equation (21), we obtain:















































The terms in parenthesis in (34) are positive and they are multiplied by
positive terms. Hence, TFPJ > 0.
Using the ￿rms￿￿rst-order condition in (14) and the zero pro￿t condition
in (8) we get that the following relation between the cuto⁄ Jt and capital
Kt :





















a(j)dj ￿ (1 ￿ Jt)
￿
30For a given Kt the left-hand side of this equation varies with Jt from +1
to zero. Moreover, one can easily show that the left-hand side is decreasing
in Jt: Thus, there exists a unique Jt which solves the equation. In addition,
it is increasing in Kt: Because Jt is increasing in Kt; so is output Yt and wage
wt: In addition, since, for a given Kt, output Yt is uniquely determined, so is
the Rt; i.e., Rt is a function of Kt. ￿
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
We use equations (13) and (20) to express Kt as a function of rt and Jt: By












































Since ￿(J) is continuous and ￿(0) = 1; ￿(1) = 0; there always exists a J￿
that satis￿es the equation below:
[1=￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
1￿￿￿
￿￿ ￿ = ￿ ￿ ￿(J
￿): (38)
We have to show that for any J￿ satisfying equation (38) there exists a
pair (c￿;K￿), both positive, such that R(K￿) = 1=￿ and c￿ = Y (K￿)￿￿K￿:
This is an immediate consequence of proposition 1.
If there is more than one J￿ satisfying equation (38), then there will be
multiple steady states. Note that for given parameters ￿;￿; and ￿; the shape
of the function ￿(J) is entirely determined by the shape of function a(j): If
a(j) is such that ￿J > 0 then (38) can have multiple solutions. To conclude
the proof, we must show that there exists a function a(j) such that ￿J > 0:














































; if j > J2:
(39)
where bi;Ni > 0: The constant and b2 must satisfy the following restric-
tions to guarantee continuity:
b2 = (J1 + b1):





















> J1 > 0
lim
N1!1
￿ aJ (J) =
limN1!1 ￿ a(J) ￿ J1
(1 ￿ J)
> 0
Therefore, as long as ￿ > 1, limN1!1 ￿J > 0. It follows that there
exists a ￿nite N1 for which ￿J > 0. If ￿J > 0, then ￿ will have at
least one local minimum and one local maximum, say ￿ and ￿. For any
￿ 2
￿
[1=￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)]
￿￿￿1




our model has multiple
steady-state equilibria.￿
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3






Y 0 + 1 ￿ ￿ ￿1
￿R0








R0 < 0 saddle
Y 0 ￿ ￿ > ￿CR0
R > 0
￿






Y 0 ￿ ￿ > ￿CR0
R > 0
￿








R > Y 0 ￿ ￿ > 0
￿







R > Y 0 ￿ ￿ > 0
￿







Table A.1: Steady-state stability for di⁄erent parameters con￿gurations
The eigenvalues of the transition matrix are given by:
￿1;2 = 1 +
(Y 0 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿CR0
R ￿
q￿






If R0 < 0 (odd steady states) both eigenvalues are real and ￿1 < 1 < ￿2.
If R0 > 0 (even steady states) there are four possible cases:
1. Y 0 ￿ ￿ > ￿CR0
R ^
￿




R ) ￿1;2 2 R;
￿ ￿￿1;2
￿ ￿ > 1;
2. Y 0 ￿ ￿ > ￿CR0
R ^
￿




R ) ￿1;2 2 C;
￿ ￿￿1;2
￿ ￿ > 1;
3. Y 0 ￿ ￿ < ￿CR0
R ^
￿




R ) ￿1;2 2 R;
￿ ￿￿1;2
￿ ￿ < 1;
4. Y 0 ￿ ￿ < ￿CR0
R ^
￿




R ) ￿1;2 2 C;
￿ ￿￿1;2
￿ ￿ < 1:
￿
33